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5 juillet 2024
- handle: 10670/1.5k2dsy
- halshs: halshs-03714970
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Broadcasting rights Upstream and downstream competition Exclusivity L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L42 - Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity DiscountsSujets proches
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David Martimort et al., « Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? * », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.5k2dsy
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Résumé
Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.