Income Inequality Games

Résumé 0

The paper explores different applications of the Shapley value for either inequality or poverty measures. We first investigate the problem of source decomposition of inequality measures, the so-called additive income sources inequality games, baed on the Shapley Value, introduced by Chantreuil and Trannoy (1999) and Shorrocks (1999). We show that multiplicative income sources inequality games provide dual results compared with Chantreuil and Trannoy's ones. We also investigate the case of multiplicative poverty games for which indices are non additively decomposable in order to capture contributions of sub-indices, which are multiplicatively connected with, as in the Sen Shorrocks-Thon poverty index. We finally show in the case of additive poverty indices that the Shapley value may be equivalent to traditional methods of decomposition such as subgroup consistency and additive decompositions.