Fiche du document
2014
- handle: 10670/1.60a4v8
- hal: hal-01517242
- doi: 10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9
- PRODINRA: 269081
- WOS: 000336388900003
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
common-pool resource regulation permit tax taxes expérience de laboratoire quota impôt ressource commune réglementationSujets proches
divertissement jeuxCiter ce document
Stefan Ambec et al., « Comparing regulations to protect the commons: An experimental investigation », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.