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29 décembre 2015
- handle: 10670/1.61j2ph
- hal: hal-01457337
- doi: 10.3390/g7010002
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3390/g7010002
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
C7 Conflict Contests Governance Laboratory experiments Natural resources Paradox of the plenty C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior P - Economic Systems/P.P4 - Other Economic Systems/P.P4.P48 - Political Economy • Legal Institutions • Property Rights • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Regional Studies Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q3.Q33 - Resource BoomsSujets proches
Stage Dramatics Histrionics Theatre Professional theater Stage Drama, Modern Plays Drama--Philosophy Stage HistrionicsCiter ce document
Klarizze Anne Puzon et al., « Malevolent Governance, Intra-Group Conflict and the Paradox of the Plenty: An Experiment », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.3390/g7010002
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Résumé
Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e. , the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e. , they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent.