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2024
- handle: 10670/1.68d1ym
- hal: hal-04516113
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Liability Merger Cournot Market StructureSujets proches
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Eric Langlais et al., « Product Liability Influences Incentives for Horizontal Mergers », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.68d1ym
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Résumé
This paper shows how product liability rules influence merger incentives. Consumers’ misperception of product risk critically influences which liability rule induces the strongest merger incentives. When consumers overestimate product risk, merger incentives under negligence and strict liability are similar and weaker than under no liability. When consumers underestimate product risk, merger incentives under negligence are weaker than those under strict liability but stronger than those under no liability.