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2024
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.6d6524...
- hal: hal-04547811
- doi: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101436
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101436
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Photovoltaic systems Retrospective voting Financing climate policy C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C2 - Single Equation Models • Single Variables/C.C2.C23 - Panel Data Models • Spatio-temporal Models D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q4 - Energy/Q.Q4.Q48 - Government PolicySujets proches
Grants Subventions Vouchers (Subsidies) Corporate subsidies Welfare, Corporate Government subsidies Business subsidies Corporate welfare Government aid Federal aidCiter ce document
Olivier de Groote et al., « The political economy of financing climate policy – Evidence from the solar PV subsidy programs », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101436
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Résumé
We analyze the political impact of a generous solar panel subsidization program. Subsidies far exceeded their social benefit and were partly financed by new taxes on adopters and by electricity surcharges for all consumers. We use local panel data from Belgium and find a decrease in votes for government parties in municipalities with high adoption rates. This shows that the voters’ punishment for a costly policy exceeded the potential reward by adopters who received generous subsidies. Further analysis indicates that punishment mainly comes from non-adopters, who change their vote towards anti-establishment parties.
