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- handle: 10670/1.6f3tsp
- hal: hal-02964989
- doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006
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Sebastian Bervoets et al., « Convergence in games with continua of equilibria », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006
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In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear.