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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.6fcc28...
- hal: hal-03270038
- doi: 10.1086/702014
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1086/702014
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Price caps Information-light regulation Tacit collusion Complements and substitutes Mergers Foreclosure Joint marketing agreements Coopetition D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior/L.L2.L24 - Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual CapitalCiter ce document
Patrick Rey et al., « Price caps as welfare-enhancing coopetition », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1086/702014
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Résumé
The paper analyzes the impact of price caps agreed upon by industry participants. Price caps, like mergers, allow firms to solve Cournot's multiple marginalization problem; but unlike mergers, they do not stifle price competition in case of substitutes or facilitate foreclosure in case of complements. The paper first demonstrates this for non-repeated interaction and general demand and cost functions. It then shows that allowing price caps has no impact on investment and entry in case of substitutes. Under more restrictive assumptions, the paper finally generalizes the insights to repeated price interaction, analyzing coordinated effects when goods are not necessarily substitutes.
