Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives: The Effect of Learning and Other-Regarding Preferences

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Victorien Barbet et al., « Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives: The Effect of Learning and Other-Regarding Preferences », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.6in27k


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We study the dynamics of risk-sharing cooperatives among heterogeneous agents. Based of their knowledge on their risk exposure and the performance of the cooperatives, agents choose whether or not to remain in the risk-sharing agreement. We highlight the key role of other-regarding preferences, both altruism and inequality aversion, in stabilizing less segregated (and smaller) cooperatives. Limited knowledge and learning of own risk exposure also contributes to reducing segregation. Our finding shed light on the mechanisms behind risk-sharing agreements between agents heterogeneous in their risk exposure.

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