Faraway, So Close: Skepticism, subjective Idealism and the Problem of Shine in Hegel' s Science of Logic

Résumé En

The article discusses the subchapter on Shine from Hegel’s Science of Logic in relation to Hegel’s effort to refute and overcome both, ancient and contemporary forms of skepticism. It is divided into three parts. The first part shows why, according to Hegel’s understanding, skepticism and subjective Idealism share the same onto-logical commitments; the second part will focus on the reconstruction of Hegel’s concrete account of Essense and Shine. In particular, it will show how the chapter relates to the Science of Logic as a whole and how the inconsistency of the logical constellation of Essense and Shine serves as an argument for introducing another, less problematic logical constellation. The third and concluding part will show why skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism can be subordinated under the logic of Shine and, hence, share the same aporias with it. Finally, it discusses why Hegel’s argument, as encountered in his account of Essence and Shine, paves the way for the ultimate overcoming of the restrictions that skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism impose on human knowledge and for an objective epistemological account of reality.