On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game

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7 mars 2011

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Emmanuelle Taugourdeau et al., « On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.6sbmqq


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In this methodological paper, we prove that the famous tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988) in which the capital is completely owned by foreigners possesses a Nash equilibrium even when the assumption of symmetric jurisdictions is dropped. The normality of both private and public goods is all that is needed concerning restrictions on preferences when a peculiar regime of taxation is ruled out. Moreover, we show that conditions about technology allowing for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are satisfied by most of the widely-used production functions.

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