Fiche du document
2014
- handle: 10670/1.6ygrpx
- hal: hal-01463106
- doi: 10.1515/jeeh-2014-0005
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1515/jeeh-2014-0005
Mots-clés
Economie quantitativeSujets proches
Laissez-faire bankingCiter ce document
Mathieu Bédard, « Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking System: A Persistent Misunderstanding », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1515/jeeh-2014-0005
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
A recurring citation in systemic risk literature reviews (P. Aghion, P. Bolton, and M. Dewatripont. 2000. "Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking System." European Economic Review 44:713-18) offers a model where what they describe as a free banking system is vulnerable to contagious bank runs through clearinghouse loans. The paper ignores key contributions to both free banking and financial history literature, such that the paper is of little relevance to the understanding of the stability of both free banking systems and clearinghouse arrangements. Our criticism concentrates on the institutions of banking absent or misrepresented. It is argued that their conclusions are inapplicable to free banking.