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8 novembre 2024
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.746bf2...
- hal: hal-05107631
- doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4989409
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.2139/ssrn.4989409
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Mots-clés
Fiscal dominance, game of chicken, Fiscal-Monetary Interactions E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles/E.E3.E31 - Price Level • Inflation • Deflation E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E52 - Monetary Policy E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook/E.E6.E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy • Stabilization • Treasury Policy H - Public Economics/H.H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt/H.H6.H63 - Debt • Debt Management • Sovereign DebtSujets proches
Monetary managementCiter ce document
Jean Barthelemy et al., « Fiscal Dominance: Implications for Bond Markets and Central Banking », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.2139/ssrn.4989409
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Résumé
Fiscal dominance refers to situations in which monetary policy is constrained by the public sector’s budget constraint. Large shifts in the dynamics of sovereign debts, surpluses, and central bank’s balance sheets since the Great Financial Crisis have created the perception of a heightened risk of such fiscal dominance in major jurisdictions. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal dominance. We offer a simple theory in which fiscal dominance arises as the outcome of strategic interactions between the government and the central bank.
