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2017
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.76b17f...
- isbn: 978-1-137-40807-5
- hal: hal-04056452
- doi: 10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_7
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_7
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Thinking Thoughts Mind Mind Science, Mental Mental philosophy Mind Behavioral sciences Mind-body connection Somatopsychics Mind-cure Body and soul (Philosophy) Mind-body relations Body and mind Human body--Psychological aspects Mind Human intelligence Intelligence Mind Cerebrum MindCiter ce document
Uriah Kriegel, « Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference--Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_7
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Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls ‘inner perception’ to demarcate the mental. In this paper, I offer a new interpretation of Brentano’s conception of the interrelations between mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural-kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and inner-perceivability serving as the concept’s reference-fixer.
