Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief

Fiche du document

Auteur
Date

1 juin 2011

Discipline
Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Source

Système d'information en philosophie des sciences

Collection

Centre de Documentation et de Bibliographie Philosophiques

Organisation

MSHE C. N. Ledoux

Mots-clés Fr En

Contradiction Contradiction

Sujets proches En Fr

Conation Volition Cetanā Papers nucléus

Citer ce document

Uriah KRIEGEL, « Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief », Système d'information en philosophie des sciences, ID : 10670/1.7be93a...

Métriques

Partage / Export

Résumé En

Propositions such as are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore's paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently argued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker's own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is endorsed. At the core of the endorsed account is the claim that conscious beliefs are always partly about themselves; it will be shown to follow from this that conscious beliefs in Moorean propositions are self-contradictory.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines