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2019
- handle: 10670/1.7c6584
- halshs: halshs-02095150
- doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.03.006
- PII: S0014-2921(19)30046-7
- PRODINRA: 475336
- WOS: 000470950600003
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.03.006
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Tax progressivity Welfare analysis Environmental tax reform Heterogeneity Unemployment D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D62 - Externalities D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs • Distributional Effects • Employment Effects Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q58 - Government PolicySujets proches
Environmental exploitation charges Green taxes Environmental taxes Environmental impact fees Ecological taxes Pollution charges Eco-taxes Effluent charges Ecotaxes Joblessness Grants Subventions Vouchers (Subsidies) Corporate subsidies Welfare, Corporate Government subsidies Business subsidies Corporate welfare Public markets Equity--Law and legislation Chancery Economic theory Political economy Government aid Federal aidCiter ce document
Diane Aubert et al., « Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labour Markets », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.03.006
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Résumé
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform that distributes the revenue from a green tax according to varying labour tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers, imperfect labour markets (search and match), and pollution consumption externalities. Preferences are non-homothetic (Stone-Geary utility) to take into account the potential regressivity of green taxes (the polluting good is assumed to be a necessary good). If the reform appears regressive, the gains from the double dividend can achieve Pareto improvement, using a redistributive non-linear income tax if the redistribution is not too great initially. Increasing progressivity influences the unemployment rate and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for France and conduct sensitivity analysis.