Buyer Alliances in Vertically Related Markets

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18 mars 2024

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Hugo Molina, « Buyer Alliances in Vertically Related Markets », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.7ck0ib


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Alliances of buyers to negotiate input prices with suppliers are commonplace. Using pre- and post-alliances data on bottled water purchases, I develop a structural model of bilateral oligopoly to estimate the effects of three alliances formed by retailers on their bargaining power vis-à-vis manufacturers and retail prices paid by consumers. The results provide evidence of a countervailing buyer power effect that reduces retail prices by more than 7%. Exploring determinants of buyer power, I find that changes in the bargaining ability of retailers play an important role in the countervailing force of the alliances, which otherwise would not have been profitable.

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