Fiche du document
2021
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.8010bd...
- hal: hal-03341440
- doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103783
- WOS: 000672691700009
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103783
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Vertical integration Hold-up Experimental economics Bounded rationality Social preferences C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D90 - General L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L42 - Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity DiscountsCiter ce document
Marie-Laure Allain et al., « Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103783
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
In a vertical chain in which two rivals invest before contracting with one of two competing suppliers, vertical integration can create hold-up problems for the rival. We develop an experiment to test this theoretical prediction in a setup in which suppliers can either pre commit ex ante to being greedy or degrade ex post the input they provide to their customer. Our experimental results confirm that vertical integration creates hold-up problems. However, vertical integration also generates more departures from theory, which can be explained by bounded rationality and social preferences.
