The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly

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Date

26 décembre 2021

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Source

HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société)

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Archives ouvertes

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Centre pour la communication scientifique directe

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info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess

Mots-clés En

Tort Law Strict Liability Negligence Rule Imperfect Competition Oligopoly Cournot Competition JEL Classification: D43 L13 L52 K13

Sujets proches En

Absolute liability Liability without fault Pattern Model Competition (Economics) Economic competition Competitiveness (Economics)

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Gérard Mondello et al., « The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.830386...

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This paper extends the basic unilateral accident model to allow for Cournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variables under asymmetric capacity constraints. We find that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output and higher risk compared to negligence. We also study the conditions under which both regimes converge.

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