The Role of the Concept of Soul in the Foundation of the Sciences of the Mind : Between Phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, and Philosophy of Life
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2014
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.8348ea...
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Sensation Subject Husserl Rickert Spirit Phenomenology Soul Neokantianism Windelband Dilthey Moral sciencesSujets proches
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Julien Farges, « The Role of the Concept of Soul in the Foundation of the Sciences of the Mind : Between Phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, and Philosophy of Life », Archives de Philosophie, ID : 10670/1.8348ea...
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This article focuses on a particular aspect of the post-Kantian history of the concept of soul, in the context of the discussions between phenomenology, the neo-Kantian Baden School and Dilthey’s thought on the philosophical foundation of the moral sciences ( Geisteswissenschaften) in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. The reconstruction of the opposition between a formal (neo-Kantian) and a material (Diltheyan) foundation shows that what is at stake in this debate is nothing other than the vexed relations between the concepts of soul and spirit. It is then possible, turning to Husserlian phenomenology, to show how the ability of the latter to mark out a middle way between merely formal and merely material foundations rests upon on the way in which it reactivates in the phenomenological context the essential characteristics of the Aristotelian concept of the soul.
