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2016
- handle: 10670/1.84n53q
- hal: hal-01484843
- doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12164
- PRODINRA: 387713
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12164
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
climate policy agreement contest global change competitive examination competitiveness politique de l'environnement changement climatique concours émission de carbone compétitivité accord international sur le climat productivitéSujets proches
Assurance (Insurance) Coverage, Insurance Insurance protection Insurance coverage Insurance industry Indemnity insurance Mutual insurance Underwriting Funds Funding Agreements Contract law Contracts--Law and legislation Contractual limitations Limitations, Contractual Agreements Science of climate Climate Climate science Budgeting Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Olivier Bos et al., « Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/sjoe.12164
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Résumé
We propose a simple contest-based mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infringing upon productive efficiency. Participation in the most stylized form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational; all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed. The scheme balances its budget and requires no principal. In a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version, which could potentially inform policy decisions, we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive that can serve as an effective rationale for the (gradual) formation of international environmental agreements.