Economic failures in French Recreational fishing management

Fiche du document

Date

2005

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Collection

Archives ouvertes




Citer ce document

Philippe Le Goffe et al., « Economic failures in French Recreational fishing management », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.86fglz


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé En

In France, freshwater recreational fishing management does not account for anglers' satisfaction in a sufficient manner. On one hand, fishing effort is too high creating congestion costs. On the other, environmental quality is low while there is a positive willingness-to-pay for improvements. These inefficiencies are explained by the conjunction of three phenomena. First, private property rights are attenuated under institutional pressure. Second, recreationalfishing is managed as an open access resource over the whole territory. Finally, halieutic policies focus on the protection of environmental resources and are inefficient to maximize the social rent provided by recreational fisheries. Fishing effort regulation and environmental services provision following the beneficiary-pays principle could improve collective welfare. Social pricing could insure equity in access to the resource.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en