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30 août 2022
- handle: 10670/1.86r9r9
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info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2280-7853
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info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2239-4028
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Intentionality Representation phenomenology AboutnessSujets proches
Aches Mental contentCiter ce document
Galen Strawson, « Internal and External Content: A New Alignment », Phenomenology and Mind, ID : 10670/1.86r9r9
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The debate about mental content is not well framed as internalists versus externalists, because there is both internal and external mental content. There is also a question about how best to draw the line between them, and this paper argues that this line is not usually drawn in the right place. It proposes a new alignment: the expression ‘internal content’ is to be taken to denote actually occurring, concrete, immediately phenomenologically given content. Absolutely everything else that can be said to be the content of experience is to be classified as external content. It turns out, under this new alignment, that internal content can be external content; this is the case when I think about your pain, or indeed my own pain. But this is as it should be.