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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.87398f...
- hal: hal-02906581
- doi: 10.4454/philinq.v8i2.305
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pragmatism scientific expertise Peirce Dewey Pragmatism Scientific Expertise Skepticism Criteria IgnoranceSujets proches
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Mathias Girel, « Five pragmatist insights on scientific expertise », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.4454/philinq.v8i2.305
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A common objection to a pragmatist perspective on scientific expertise is that, while there is a well-known pragmatist theory of inquiry, which was formulated first by Peirce, then refined by Dewey and others, this theory cannot provide a clear-cut account of scientific expertise. In this paper, after addressing this objection in the second section, I claim that, on the contrary, pragmatism offers robust tools to think scientific expertise. In Sections 3 to 7, I present five important insights that one can derive from a pragmatist epistemology when responding to contemporary problems posed by expertise: about science and scientific expertise in a legal context (sections 3 and 4), about collective expertise (sections 5 and 6), and even about expertise on ignorance (section 7).
