A winner’s curse in the bidding process for broadcasting rights in football? The cases of the French and UK markets
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21 juin 2017
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.8cb739...
- hal: hal-01935541
- doi: 10.1080/17430437.2018.1505869
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/17430437.2018.1505869
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Winner’s curse Football broadcasting rights First mover advantage Second mover disadvantage Bidding process Broadcast packagesSujets proches
Papers Foot-ball American football Broadcasting industry broadcastingCiter ce document
Antoine Feuillet et al., « A winner’s curse in the bidding process for broadcasting rights in football? The cases of the French and UK markets », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1080/17430437.2018.1505869
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Résumé
The winner’s curse is a well-known phenomenon in the auction theory. The main aim of this article is to verify its existence in football broadcasting rights. The underlying objective is to assess whether some indices of this situation are verified and can cause a winner’s curse. The methodology is based on the application of Andreff (2014)’s six indices and a seventh index(disappointment)to the domestic markets for broadcasting rights of the French and English football leagues. These two markets have seen an increase in the number of packages offered to broadcasters, with the possibility of several ‘winners’. The paper shows that the winner of the major packages in the auction is not cursed. The curse is more likely to happen for the second mover. As such, the paper suggests a practical recommendation for broadcasters interested in football rights: win the best package or keep away.
