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2015
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.8f2def...
- hal: hal-00964299
- doi: 10.1257/mic.20130117
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20130117
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Incomplete preferences aggregation expected multi-utility utilitarianism D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and UncertaintySujets proches
Impassivity Indifference UnconcernCiter ce document
Eric Danan et al., « Harsanyi's aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1257/mic.20130117
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Résumé
We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinement of the representation.
