Fiche du document
2021
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.966417...
- hal: hal-03662042
- doi: 10.1007/s41130-021-00145-z
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s41130-021-00145-z
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Nonpoint source pollution Ambient-based taxes Cooperation Size effect sucker’s payoff Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q53 - Air Pollution • Water Pollution • Noise • Hazardous Waste • Solid Waste • Recycling H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group BehaviorSujets proches
Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy Taxes Grants Subventions Vouchers (Subsidies) Corporate subsidies Welfare, Corporate Government subsidies Business subsidies Corporate welfare Distribution, Cooperative Cooperative distribution Cooperative movement Government aid Federal aidCiter ce document
Hamet Sarr et al., « Is the “average Pigouvian tax” robust to the size of the group of polluters? », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1007/s41130-021-00145-z
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We study the “average Pigouvian tax” (APT), an ambient-based policy instrument that requires polluters to cooperate to achieve the social optimum. In this paper, we are interested in the group size variation and its effect of the APT efficiency. Indeed, in the field, the implementation of the instrument will face group sizes that can vary from a few to a large number of farmers. We find that increasing the size of the group reduces cooperation among subjects, thereby reducing the efficiency of the instrument. We also show that when the sucker’s cost is lowered, the instrument can converge towards the social optimum.
