Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

Fiche du document

Date

6 mai 2008

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Collection

Archives ouvertes

Licence

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess




Citer ce document

Nicolas Jacquemet et al., « Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.96b08a...


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines