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- handle: 10670/1.97lqwy
- hal: hal-00607075
- doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039
- PRODINRA: 19916
- WOS: 000244492400015
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039
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Mots-clés
Informed Principal Countervailing Incentives Risk Neutrality D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
Worth Axiology Neutralism Neutrality--Law and legislation Funds Funding Knowledge, Classification of Codes Contractions Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Pierre Fleckinger, « Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039
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Résumé
It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives.