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- handle: 10670/1.9mksjv
- hal: hal-01693887
- doi: 10.1257/mic.20150119
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20150119
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D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L15 - Information and Product Quality • Standardization and Compatibility L - Industrial Organization/L.L8 - Industry Studies: Services/L.L8.L82 - Entertainment • MediaSujets proches
Nurture and nature Nature versus nurture Genetics and environment Nature--Nurture Environment Heredity and environment Environment Ecological science Environmental biology Bionomics Ecological sciences Environment Balance of nature Oecology Biology--Ecology Ecological processes EnvironmentCiter ce document
Pierre Fleckinger et al., « Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1257/mic.20150119
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Résumé
We develop a model of costly quality provision under biased disclosure. We define as friendly an environment in which the disclosure probability increases with quality, and as hostile an environment in which the opposite holds. Hostile environments produce a positive externality among sellers and potentially multiple equilibria. In contrast, friendly environments always yield a unique equilibrium. We establish that the environment that maximizes quality generates signals contradicting buyers' expectations. Hence, hostility produces greater incentives for quality than friendliness when costs are low and monitoring resources high.