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23 août 2014
- handle: 10670/1.9n5aue
- halshs: halshs-01109832
- doi: 10.15496/publikation-415
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Comte hypothesis positivismSujets proches
Supposition AssumptionCiter ce document
Michel Bourdeau, « La théorie positive des hypothèses », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.15496/publikation-415
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In spite of its importance (it triggered the interest for the topic in the nineteenth century), Comte's theory of hypothesis has not received the attention it deserves, and there has been no in-depth study of it since a paper by Laudan in 1971. The argument takes its starting point in the fact that there is more in our ways of reasoning than induction and deduction. Science could not progress without scientists resorting to hypothesis, that is, moving away from data, assuming some phenomenon, drawing consequences from it and asking if they agree or not with facts. Then, the question is: what kind of hypothesis is admissible, what kind is not? Comte's answer is often dismissed as verificationist but there is much more to say about it. When he spoke about unverifiable hypothesis, he had in mind instances like phlogiston, calorific or "éther luminifere", which were still quite common in his time, and he relied on the pioneer thermodynamical works of Fourier, who precisely began by rejecting this very kind of hypothesis; but the theory has also to be understood in relation to his anti-metaphysical stance. The influence of Comte's theory can be seen in the work of Duhem but mainly in Peirce's theory of abduction.