Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision

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Date

2009

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Type de document
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HAL-SHS : économie et finance

Collection

Archives ouvertes

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Centre pour la communication scientifique directe

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info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess

Mots-clés En

alternating offers varying discount rates subgame perfection union firm bargaining

Sujets proches En

Papers Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Pattern Model Bank discount Discount rate Bargaining Labor negotiations

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Ahmet Ozkardas et al., « Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.9rjl23

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Résumé En

In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria.

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