Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.tranpol.2004.07.003
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Romain Petiot, « Parking enforcement and travel demand management », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.tranpol.2004.07.003
This article deals with on-street, non-free parking policy. The aim is to show how parking meter violation challenges the travel demand management policy. The literature widely admits that only the increase in the enforcement effort both deters drivers from offending and contribute to moderating car use. Nevertheless, the link between parking non-compliance, enforcement effort and travel demand has never been examined. We show that when parking meter violation behaviour, fine level choice, modal split and travel demand are connected, the fine increase paradoxically supports car use and encourages parking violation in the case of large parking congestion in particular.