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1 mars 2018
- handle: 10670/1.a2pqsn
- hal: hal-03471715
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/7rrsl07p559bjr85tr7hsft1o9
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/7rrsl07p559bjr85tr7hsft1o9
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Policy mix evaluation R&D investment Spatial panel French Nuts3 regions H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O38 - Government PolicySujets proches
Grants Subventions Vouchers (Subsidies) Corporate subsidies Welfare, Corporate Government subsidies Business subsidies Corporate welfare Frenchmen (French people) Government aid Federal aidCiter ce document
Benjamin Montmartin et al., « The impact of the French policy mix on business R&D : how geography matters », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10670/1.a2pqsn
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Résumé
Based on a spatial extension of an R&D investment model, this paper measures the macroeconomic impact of the French R&D policy mix on business R&D using regional data. Our measure takes into account not only the direct effect of policies but also indirect effects generated by the existence of spatial interaction between regions. Using a unique database containing information on the levels of various R&D policy instruments received by firms in French NUTS3 regions over the period 2001-2011, our estimates of a spatial Durbin model with structural breaks and fixed effects reveal the existence of a negative spatial dependence among R&D investments in regions. In this context, while a-spatial estimates would conclude that all instruments have a crowding-in effect, we show that national subsidies are the only instrument that is able to generate significant crowding-in effects. On the contrary, it seems that the design, size and spatial allocation of funds from the other instruments (tax credits, local subsidies, European subsidies) lead them to act (in the French context) as beggar-thy-neighbor policies.