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22 août 2019
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.a61d3d...
- isbn: 9780190494100
- hal: hal-03937663
- doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190494087.013.4
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190494087.013.4
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
reputation honor esteem self-interest social epistemologySujets proches
Knowledge--Philosophy Mental philosophy Theory of knowledge EpistemologyCiter ce document
Gloria Origgi, « Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190494087.013.4
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Résumé
This chapter analyzes the philosophical import of the notion of reputation along two main axes: (1) reputation as a motivation for action, and (2) reputation as a special kind of social information. Is reputation a rational motive of action? Can it be an ultimate aim or is it always reducible to some kind of self-interest? Is reputation a rational means to extract information from the social world? Should we rely on other’s evaluations? By reconstructing the philosophy of reputation in the history of thought and analyzing the contemporary approaches to reputation in philosophy, the chapter also provides also some rudiments of an “epistemology of reputation.”
