Une justification de l'induction dans les sciences de la nature

Résumé En Fr

We endeavour to deal with the philosophical problem of induction by placing ourselves inside the experience of those who, in the course of the centuries, have thought and lived it through practice as research workers, and also inside the radical newness of certain features of contemporary physics. The contrast between the words of Duns Scotus and Karl Popper at first invites us to turn to the one who separate them in time, namely Hume, and to discern what may be his error in analysing the human understanding about «matters of fact», since his influence on the progress of science in his own age and later was so slight. We believe that his error is to be found in the fact that he neglects those acts of the mind 'which he, however, mentions and of which we shall then strive to show the authenticity in some great thinkers since Aristotle. We shall try after that to point out — illustrating our argument with the aid of contemporary physics, which makes obvious that any minor deviation from the unity and stability of the real into its center, which is discrete and quantified matter, would lead to chaos — how those acts of the mind which dare to induce, have their foundation in an exigency of the mind; for we cannot prove this universal order, but only acknowledge it, and acknowledge also that the real is not possible without it, and this was already more or less seen by Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Newton ... Thus we are forced back to the more basic philosophical question: «What is the source of this order and of its maintenance?», a question linked to another: «Where does this intelligibility deposited in the real come from, and how are we attuned to it?». This latter question arises itself from the existence of true and unreformable elements in present scientific knowledge of the real. Scotus and Karl Popper at first invites us to turn to the one who separate them in time, namely Hume, and to discern what may be his error in analysing the human understanding about «matters of fact», since his influence on the progress of science in his own age and later was so slight. We believe that his error is to be found in the fact that he neglects those acts of the mind 'which he, however, mentions and of which we shall then strive to show the authenticity in some great thinkers since Aristotle. We shall try after that to point out — illustrating our argument with the aid of contemporary physics, which makes obvious that any minor deviation from the unity and stability of the real into its center, which is discrete and quantified matter, would lead to chaos — how those acts of the mind which dare to induce, have their foundation in an exigency of the mind; for we cannot prove this universal order, but only acknowledge it, and acknowledge also that the real is not possible without it, and this was already more or less seen by Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Newton ... Thus we are forced back to the more basic philosophical question: «What is the source of this order and of its maintenance?», a question linked to another: «Where does this intelligibility deposited in the real come from, and how are we attuned to it?». This latter question arises itself from the existence of true and unreformable elements in present scientific knowledge of the real.

Nous essayons de traiter le problème philosophique de l'induction en nous enracinant dans l'expérience de ceux qui, au long des siècles, l'ont pensé et vécu dans leur pratique de chercheurs, et aussi dans la nouveauté radicale de certains aspects de la physique contemporaine. Le contraste entre les sentences de Duns Scot et de Karl Popper invite d'abord à se pencher sur celui qui les sépare dans le temps, à savoir Hume, et à discerner, puisque son influence sur la marche de la science à son époque et après a été si faible, en quoi consisterait son erreur dans son analyse de l'entendement humain en ce qui concerne les «matters of fact». Nous croyons la trouver dans le fait qu'il néglige ces actes de l'esprit que cependant il mentionne et dont nous nous attachons ensuite à décrire l'authenticité chez de grands penseurs depuis Aristote. Nous cherchons alors à montrer comment _ ceci étant illustré par la physique contemporaine qui manifeste que la moindre déviance dans l'unité et la stabilité du réel en son cœur qu'est la matière quantifiée conduirait au chaos _ ces actes de l'esprit qui osent induire trouvent leur fondement dans une exigence de ce même esprit; car nous ne pouvons prouver cet ordre universel mais seulement le reconnaître, et reconnaître que sans lui le réel n'est pas possible, ceci étant d'ailleurs plus ou moins déjà perçu par un Aristote, un Duns Scot, un Newton ... Nous sommes ainsi renvoyés à une question philosophique plus profonde: «quelle est la source de cet ordre et de sa conservation?», question liée à une autre: «d'où vient cette intelligibilité déposée dans le réel et comment lui sommes-nous accordés?», naissant elle-même de l'existence d'éléments vrais et irréformables dans la connaissance scientifique présente du réel.