The Demarcation Problem: the "scientific" predicate, a socio-political status or an epistemic assessment?

Résumé En

What do we say when we affirm that a theory, a discipline or a decision is scientific? When we use the scientific predicate, do we learn something about the epistemic nature of the object we are describing, or do we just say something about its social and political status? If using the scientific predicate leads to a properly epistemic observation, the demarcation question is the responsibility of the philosopher. If the scientific predicate is only the mark of a social decision, then it is no longer within the domain of philosophy (Laudan, 1983). Nevertheless, if we adopt a value-laden ideal (Douglas, 2009), Laudan's argument is no longer relevant. The demarcation problem reappears. The chief aims of this study are: i) to discern which values are involved in the demarcation question, ii) to determine who is best suited to deal with the demarcation problem, iii) to refine our understanding of the distinction between real science and pseudoscience. To do so, we will: 1° use Heather Douglas's contributions to philosophy of science so as to reply to Laudan, 2° improve in several ways the Topology of Values in Science proposed by Douglas (2009) in order to offer a better understanding of unacceptable practices (politicized science, fraud-science, junk-science, pseudoscience, bad-science) and to identify more precisely steps of the research process during which it is appropriate to pay attention to non-academic discourses.