Financial Auditors and Agency Conflicts: A Study of Audit Fee Determinants in France

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Date

2013

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Accounting Auditing Control

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Cairn.info

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Cairn

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Cairn

Mots-clés En

controlling shareholders audit fees agency conflict minority expropriation

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Investors Shareholders

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Chiraz Ben Ali et al., « Financial Auditors and Agency Conflicts: A Study of Audit Fee Determinants in France », Accounting Auditing Control, ID : 10670/1.b392dd...

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Considering financial statements auditing as a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry, one can hypothesize that agency conflicts influence audit fees. Studying the audit fees paid by SBF 250 listed firms, our results show: (1) the absence of a significant relationship between managerial ownership and audit fees; (2) a curvilinear relation (inverted U-shape) between controlling shareholders- ownership and audit fees; (3) a negative relation between family control and audit fees. These results highlight the dominance of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in France, unlike in Anglo-Saxon countries where the dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders. The study draws practical implications for practitioners and regulators.

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