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- handle: 10670/1.b7awny
- hal: hal-01052680
- doi: 10.1007/s10058-012-0138-2
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s10058-012-0138-2
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Strategic boundedness Weakly dominated strategy Mechanism design C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D50 - GeneralSujets proches
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Gaël Giraud et al., « Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s10058-012-0138-2
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Résumé
We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of competitive outcomes in a pure-exchange economy with finitely many households. We construct a feasible price-quantity mechanism, which fully implements Walras equilibria via Nash equilibria in fairly general environments. Traders' preferences need neither to be ordered nor continuous. In addition, the mechanism is such that no pure strategy is weakly dominated, hence is bounded (in the sense of Jackson 1992). In particular it makes no use of any integer game.