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- handle: 10670/1.b8n06e
- hal: hal-01950057
- doi: 10.1628/093245617X15120238641839
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1628/093245617X15120238641839
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Mots-clés
cost asymmetry optimal punishments outsider repeated game tacit collusion C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's games Businesses Firms Companies Enterprises Business organizations Organizations, BusinessCiter ce document
Guillaume Cheikbossian et al., « On the difficulty of collusion in the presence of a more efficient outsider », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1628/093245617X15120238641839
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Résumé
We study the ability of several identical firms to collude in the presence of a more efficient firm, which does not take part in their collusive agreement. The cartel firms adopt stick-and-carrot strategies, while the efficient firm plays its one-period best-response function, regardless of the history of play. We characterize the most collusive symmetric punishment, which maximizes the scope for collusion. We then find that either a lower cost disadvantage or a smaller cartel size facilitates collusion. Finally, we compare our results with those obtained in the standard setup where all firms participate in the collusive agreement.