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26 septembre 2012
- handle: 10670/1.bbxhva
- hal: hal-01551728
- doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-33260-9_4
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-33260-9_4
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Cryptographic hash algorithm SHA-3 competition algebraic cryptanalysis logical cryptanalysis SATisfiability solversSujets proches
Cryptology Steganography Secret writing CryptanalysisCiter ce document
Ekawat Homsirikamol et al., « Security Margin Evaluation of SHA-3 Contest Finalists through SAT-Based Attacks », HAL-SHS : sciences de l'information, de la communication et des bibliothèques, ID : 10.1007/978-3-642-33260-9_4
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Résumé
In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. In this paper, the security margin of five SHA-3 finalists is evaluated with an assumption that attacks launched on finalists should be practically verified. A method of attacks is called logical cryptanalysis where the original task is expressed as a SATisfiability problem. To simplify the most arduous stages of this type of cryptanalysis and helps to mount the attacks in a uniform way a new toolkit is used. In the context of SAT-based attacks, it has been shown that all the finalists have substantially bigger security margin than the current standards SHA-256 and SHA-1.