Escaping social pressure: Fixed-term contracts in multi-establishment firms

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.027

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Andrea Bassanini et al., « Escaping social pressure: Fixed-term contracts in multi-establishment firms », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.027


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We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.

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