Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.bfz37g
- halshs: halshs-01053478
- doi: 10.3982/ECTA11070
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3982/ECTA11070
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Strategic communication Hard information Information disclosure Masquerade relation Belief consistency Single crossing differences Deliberation Supermodular gamesSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's gamesCiter ce document
Jeanne Hagenbach et al., « Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.3982/ECTA11070
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information revelation. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We first characterize the augmented games in which there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). Next, we define a class of games for which existence of a fully revealing equilibrium is equivalent to a richness property of the evidence structure. This characterization enables us to provide different sets of sufficient conditions for full information disclosure that encompass and extend all known results in the literature, and are easily applicable. We use these conditions to obtain new insights in games with strategic complementarities, voting with deliberation, and persuasion games with multidimensional types.