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26 octobre 2011
- handle: 10670/1.blq6ho
- halshs: halshs-00635801
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Coordination game Cheap talk communication OathCiter ce document
Nicolas Jacquemet et al., « Coordination with Communication under Oath », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.blq6ho
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Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic sequential coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.