Central bank’s stabilization and communication policies when firms have motivated overconfidence in their own information accuracy or processing
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Date
24 juin 2022
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Type de document
Périmètre
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Identifiants
- handle: 10670/1.c1cu60
- hal: hal-04072292
Collection
Organisation
Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E52 - Monetary Policy E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E58 - Central Banks and Their PoliciesSujets proches
Monetary management Banks, Central Central banking Central banks Banker's banksCiter ce document
Camille Cornand et al., « Central bank’s stabilization and communication policies when firms have motivated overconfidence in their own information accuracy or processing », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.c1cu60
