Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.c2uygx
- hal: hal-00641865
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Informed Principal Countervailing Incentives Risk Neutrality D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorSujets proches
Pattern Model Communication, Primitive Mass communicationCiter ce document
Pierre Fleckinger, « Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.c2uygx
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
This paper studies communication mechanisms for two players with symmetric single-peaked preferences. The peaks are privately known and drawn from a uniform distribution before the agents take a collective decision. While for the general setting Moulin (1980) characterized all strategy-proof mechanisms, much remains to be known in the Bayesian framework. The example consists of a dichotomic mechanism, that yields a strictly higher ex-ante expected utility than the best "min-max" rule. The properties of the mechanism are analyzed, then limits and possible directions for generalization are discussed.