Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable
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2022
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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.c309d8...
- halshs: halshs-03760333
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info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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climate change efficiency intergenerational equity population ethics infinite streams D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D61 - Allocative Efficiency • Cost–Benefit Analysis D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q54 - Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global WarmingSujets proches
Equity--Law and legislation Chancery Science of climate Climate Climate science Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examinationCiter ce document
Geir B. Asheim et al., « Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.c309d8...
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