Fiche du document
2016
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.c4302f...
- hal: hal-01285559
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Trade Policy Instruments Product Research and Development North-South Duopoly Vertical Differentiation. F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F13 - Trade Policy • International Trade Organizations O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O30 - GeneralSujets proches
Trade policy Foreign trade policy International trade policy Trade policy International trade--Government policyCiter ce document
Julien Berthoumieu et al., « Vertical Differentiation, Uncertainty, Product R&D and Policy Instruments in a North-South Duopoly », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.c4302f...
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Résumé
This paper analyzes the impact of several trade policy instruments on product Research and Development (R&D) investment in a North-South duopoly where a Northern firm competes in prices with a Southern firm on both markets. The Northern firm invests in product R&D owing to a competitive disadvantage compared to the Southern firm which benefits from a lower labor cost. The outcome of the R&D activity is uncertain. If successful, vertical differentiation occurs in both markets. The Northern country’s government is the only one policy active and may implement the following trade policy instruments: an import tariff, a production subsidy, an R&D subsidy, a standard of quality, a minimum-price, and an import quota. The results show that the Northern firm’s R&D expenditures increase with each policy instrument except for the import quota. The paper also provides a welfare analysis in order to verify whether or not the Northern government is encouraged to implement these policy instruments.
