Machiavelli before Pareto: Foxes, Lions and the Social Equilibrium as a result of a Non-logical Actions Machiavel avant Pareto: Renards, Lions et Équilibre social comme résultat d'actions non-logiques
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2019
- handle: 10670/1.c5wj1i
- halshs: halshs-01708579
Mots-clés
Pareto Machiavelli Machiavellian Moment Social Equilibrium Rationality History of Economic Thought B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches/B.B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925/B.B1.B13 - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Stockholm School) B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches/B.B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925/B.B1.B15 - Historical • Institutional • Evolutionary B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches/B.B4 - Economic Methodology/B.B4.B41 - Economic Methodology Z - Other Special Topics/Z.Z0 - General/Z.Z0.Z00 - GeneralSujets proches
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Ludovic Ragni et al., « Machiavel avant Pareto: Renards, Lions et Équilibre social comme résultat d'actions non-logiques », HAL-SHS : sociologie, ID : 10670/1.c5wj1i
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This article examines the way Pareto addresses the dynamic of social equilibrium and the evolution of economic institutions based on the principle of rupture of the Machiavellian Moment. In the first part, we analyse why and how Pareto's categories (residues, derivation, interests and social heterogeneity, logical actions and non-logical actions) borrow from those of Machiavelli (virtù, fortuna, corruption and ordine), to define various forms of Machiavellian Moment. In the second part, we show that this borrowing allows Pareto to explain: (i) the evolution of political equilibriums, from the distinction the author makes between “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” and “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy”; and (ii) the alternative between free trade and protectionism.