7 mai 2017
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Paul Egré, « Vague judgment: a probabilistic account », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1007/s11229-016-1092-2
This paper explores the idea that vague predicates like "tall", "loud" or "expensive" are applied based on a process of analog magnitude representation, whereby magnitudes are represented with noise. I present a probabilistic account of vague judgment, partly inspired by early remarks from E. Borel on vagueness, and use it to model judgments about borderline cases. The model involves two main components: probabilistic magnitude representation on the one hand, and a notion of subjective criterion. The framework is used to represent judgments of the form "x is clearly tall" vs. "x is tall", as involving a shift of one's criterion, and then to derive observed patterns of acceptance for sentences of the form "x is tall and not tall" / "x is neither tall nor not tall".